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    The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court*
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  04-3078
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
      v.
HASSAN AKBAR,
a/k/a TARIQ AKBAR
      Hassan Tariq Akbar,
                   Appellant
                                   
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No.: 02-CR-773
District Judge: The Honorable Stewart Dalzell
                                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 12, 2006
Before: BARRY, SMITH, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges*
(Filed: May 24, 2006 )
                                   
OPINION
                                   
2SMITH, Circuit Judge.
On October 22, 2003, Hassan Akbar pleaded guilty, pursuant to a Guilty Plea
Agreement, to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1).  The Agreement provided that Akbar “acknowledges his waiver of rights,” as
set forth in an attached Acknowledgment of Rights.  The Acknowledgment stated that,
inter alia, Akbar understood that if he pleaded guilty he “waived [his] right to appeal,
except as set forth in [the] appellate waiver provisions of my plea agreement.”  Paragraph
Nine of the Guilty Plea Agreement stated that Akbar “voluntarily and expressly waives all
right to appeal or collaterally attack [his] conviction, sentence, or any other matter
relating to this prosecution” unless the government appealed the sentence, his sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum, or the District Judge departed upward from the
applicable guideline range.  Paragraph Nine further declared that if Akbar filed an appeal,
“no issue may be presented . . . on appeal other than those described in this paragraph.”  
During the plea colloquy, the District Judge and the prosecutor reviewed the terms
of the Guilty Plea Agreement, including the waiver of his appellate rights.  Akbar
affirmed that he understood that his right to appeal was limited to the three instances
enumerated in the Agreement.  At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the District Judge
declared that Akbar’s plea was knowing and voluntary.  
The pre-sentence report (PSR) calculated a total offense level of 23 and a criminal
    The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise1
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
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history category of IV, yielding a guideline range of 70 to 87 months.  At sentencing, the
defense objected to the assessment of certain points because of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  The District Court
acknowledged the uncertainty created by Blakely, sustained some of Akbar’s objections,
and revised Akbar’s criminal history category to III.  As a result, his guideline range was
reduced to 57 to 71 months.  The District Judge concluded that a sentence of 60 months,
which was within this range, was fair.  In addition, he declared that “if the Guidelines did
not apply, I still think that would be a fair sentence, using the traditional sentencing
factors.  So, I would . . . in all honesty, impose[] the same sentence.”   1
Akbar, proceeding pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal.  Defense counsel
concluded that there were no non-frivolous issues to appeal and filed a motion to
withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  In Anders, the Supreme
Court held that the “constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process”
necessitates that appellant’s counsel vigorously act as an advocate for the defendant.  Id. 
at 744. Thus, counsel’s 
role as advocate requires that he support his client’s appeal to the best of his
ability.  Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a
conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw.  That request, must, however, be accompanied by a
brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal.
4Id.  In United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001), we reiterated that an
Anders brief must demonstrate that counsel has “thoroughly examined the record in
search of appealable issues,” and it must “explain why the issues are frivolous.” Id.
(citing United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Akbar’s counsel correctly explained that Akbar’s guilty plea constituted a waiver
of almost all issues for appeal.  As a result, counsel asserted that Akbar was limited to
claiming that he a had constitutional right not to be haled into court on a charge, to
challenging the validity of his guilty plea, and to attacking the legality of his sentence. 
See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574-76 (1989); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).  Record citations were provided to support  the
validity of Akbar’s guilty plea.  Counsel explained that the imposition of Akbar’s
sentence under the mandatory guidelines did not present a basis for appeal because the
District Judge had sentenced Akbar alternatively under an indeterminate sentencing
scheme.  Thus, consistent with our decision in United States v. Hill, 411 F.3d 425 (3d Cir.
2005), any error was harmless.
Consistent with Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a), Akbar was apprised
of counsel’s motion to withdraw and afforded an opportunity to file a response.  Akbar’s
pro se brief asserted that the calculation of his offense level was incorrect in light of
Blakely and that his counsel had been ineffective.
The prosecution agreed with defense counsel that there was no basis for appeal.  In
5addition, the prosecution asserted that Akbar’s waiver of his appellate rights warranted
the dismissal of this appeal.  In a supplemental submission, Akbar claimed that he did not
have knowledge of the terms of the written plea and the waiver of his appeal rights.   
We declared in United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001), that
“waivers of appeals, if entered into knowingly and voluntarily, are valid.”  We
recognized, however, that some waivers may be invalidated if there is an error amounting
to a miscarriage of justice.  In determining whether an error warrants invalidating an
appellate waiver, we observed that consideration should be given to the alleged error, its
gravity, its character, the impact of the error on the parties, and the extent to which the
defendant acquiesced in the result.  Id. at 563 (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d
14, 25 (1st Cir. 2001)). 
Here, the waiver of Akbar’s right of appeal was set forth in both the Guilty Plea
Agreement and the Acknowledgment of Rights.  Akbar signed both of these documents. 
During the plea colloquy, the District Court inquired whether Akbar understood that by
pleading guilty he was waiving certain rights, including the right to appeal.  Akbar
affirmed that he understood the significance of his plea.  The prosecution proceeded to
review the specific terms of the Guilty Plea Agreement, including the waiver of his
appellate rights.  Thereafter, the District Judge reiterated that under the Agreement, Akbar
could only appeal if three things occurred: the government appealed from the sentence;
the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum; or the Court departed upward and
6sentenced Akbar above the applicable guideline range.  The District Judge further
explained, citing anecdotes regarding his own history with respect to sentencing
proceedings, that it was unlikely that any of these events would occur.   When the District
Judge inquired if Akbar understood the limitations of the waiver, Akbar replied that he
did.  We conclude that Akbar’s waiver of his right to appeal was knowing and voluntary
as required by Khattak.  273 F.3d at 562.
Nor do we find any error warranting the invalidation of Akbar’s appellate waiver. 
Akbar’s pro se submissions make much of the fact that he was sentenced under a
mandatory guidelines regime, that certain sentencing factors were considered even though
they were not determined by a jury, and that this was error in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  This argument is not
persuasive for two reasons.  First, it ignores the fact that the District Judge sentenced
Akbar, in the alternative, to the same 60 month term of imprisonment under an
indeterminate sentencing scheme.  Thus, consistent with Hill, 411 F.3d at 426, this
alternative sentence rendered any error harmless and eliminated any basis for setting aside
Akbar’s waiver.  Moreover, in United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 213 (3d Cir. 2005),
we concluded that the subsequent change in the law effected by Booker did not undercut
the validity of the defendant’s appellate waiver.  We explained that the “possibility of a
favorable change in the law occurring after a plea agreement is merely one of the risks
that accompanies a guilty plea.”  Id. at 214.  Without more, there was no basis for setting
     Rather, Akbar makes vague allegations that his counsel did not “consult[] with [him]2
about the standing of Blakely and how it could affect [him] until the day of sentencing,”
and that he “should have been allowed to replea [sic] because at the time of the guilty
plea, neither the accused, nor his counsel, nor the district court correctly understood the
essential elements of the crime with which he was charged.”
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aside the appellate waiver.
Similarly, Akbar’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do not warrant
invalidation of his appellate waiver.  Although it is possible for there to be a miscarriage
of justice when “plea proceedings were tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel,”
Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25 n.9, we find no possible miscarriage of justice in the circumstances
presented by this case.  As an initial matter, Akbar does not claim that the waiver itself
was the product of ineffectiveness.   Moreover, a waiver does not “become[]2
unenforceable simply because a defendant ‘claims’ . . . ineffective assistance,” but only
“if the record of the criminal proceeding revealed that the claim that the waiver was the
result of ineffective assistance of counsel was meritorious.”  United States v. Monzon,
359 F.3d 110, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2004).  The record does not indicate that Akbar could
succeed on an ineffective assistance claim.  
Accordingly, we will grant the government’s motion to enforce the appellate
waiver and to dismiss this appeal.  We will also grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.  We
further certify that the issues presented in this appeal lack legal merit and thus do not
require the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  3d Cir.
L.A.R 109.2(b). 
